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Sometimes statements made by people working in the finance industry when giving advice 
may be incorrect. This article examines how the tort of negligence applies to the making of 
these misrepresentations. Cases discussed include Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, Mutual Life & Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 
CLR 556, Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (1980-1981) 150 CLR 
225, Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1, Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 
[1990] 2 AC 605 and Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 




The types of occupation that are included within the 
broad category of ‘the finance industry’ cover a wide 
range of duties. Many of these occupations require the 
giving of advice, perhaps to individual clients 
concerned about their personal finances or to business 
clients looking to optimise the financial outcomes for 
their business. The type of advice may relate, for 
example, to investment strategies, superannuation, 
products and services. If this advice turns out to be 
incorrect and the person or business to whom it was 
given loses money as a result, they may seek 
compensation from the advice giver. The legal action 
most likely to be used is that of the tort of negligence, 
for what is known variously as ‘negligent misstatement’ 
or ‘negligent misrepresentation’. 
 
This article examines how an advisor in the finance 
industry may be liable in the tort of negligence for 
information or advice given in the course of his or her 
employment. Negligence is where the negligent act of 
one party causes a loss (known as damage) to another 
and the law determines that that the circumstances are 
such that the loss should be shifted from one to the 
other. In negligence the loss may be personal injury, 
including pure psychiatric injury, property damage or 
pure economic (financial) loss.1 The person who suffers 
the loss is the plaintiff and the defendant is the person 
that the plaintiff considers to be responsible for that 
particular loss. In the situation being discussed in this 
article the loss is pure economic loss and the defendant 




A distinction must be made between those situations 
where the advice or information is given with the 
knowledge that it is untrue (and with the intention it 
should be relied upon), and those situations where the 
giver of the advice is negligent as to whether it is true or 
false. The former is fraud, or fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and the plaintiff can sue in deceit; 
the latter is negligent misrepresentation, the subject of 
this article. The tort of deceit may be quite difficult for a 
plaintiff to successfully claim. The plaintiff must show 
                                                 
1 ‘Pure’ psychiatric loss and ‘pure’ economic loss in this 
context means the loss is unattached to any accompanying 
physical injury or property damage. Where there is physical 
injury or property damage any resultant psychiatric injury or 
economic loss may be recovered as one of the heads of 
compensatory damage: F McGlone and A Stickley, Australian 
Torts Law (2009) 338-341. 
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(on the balance of probabilities) that there was a 
misrepresentation of fact which the defendant knew to 
be false, that the plaintiff suffered financial loss as a 
result of relying on the misrepresentation, and the 
defendant intended that reliance.2 The knowledge of the 
falsity may be absolute on the part of the defendant or it 
may be reckless, but carelessness is not sufficient for 
deceit.3 While deceit may be harder to prove, the 
damages awarded are more favourable than in the tort 
of negligence, and disclaimers are not effective where 
there is fraud.4
 
It should also be noted that the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) (‘the TPA’) has eroded the use of actions in 
tort for misrepresentations. This is particularly true of 
s 52(1) of the TPA which provides that ‘a corporation 
shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that 
is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or 
deceive’.5 Actions brought under s 52 can generally 
only be brought against a corporation,6 but the 
employer of the advisor in the financial industry is 
usually going to qualify as a corporation.7 The TPA 
circumvents problems with a ‘special relationship’ 
existing between the plaintiff and defendant in 
negligence, discussed later, or the requirement to prove 
intention in deceit. However, in most cases where 
advice is given in the finance industry, the use of s 52 of 
the TPA is excluded by s 51AF which says the relevant 
part of the TPA does not apply to financial services.8
                                                 
                                                                            
2 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, 347-348 (Lord 
Bramwell). 
3 McGlone and Stickley, above n 1, 417, 419. 
4 J Fleming, The Law of Torts (1998) 696 fn14, 702-703. 
5 Section 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’) mirrors the 
provisions of s 52 of the TPA. 
6 There are certain limited exceptions in s 6 of the TPA which 
allows actions to be brought against individuals. 
7 Plaintiffs generally sue the employer of the person who 
caused the loss (financial or otherwise) as this is the ‘deep 
pocket’; the employer is vicariously liable for the torts 
committed by an employee in the course of employment. If 
the defendant is not a corporation, the action can be brought 
under the mirror legislation in the various states: in Western 
Australia this is the Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) s 10.  
8 ‘Financial service’ is defined in s 51AF of the TPA by 
reference to Part 2 of Division 2 of the ASIC Act. This in turn 
answers the question ‘When does a person provide a financial 
 
Where there is a contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, as there is between the financial advisor and 
his or her client, the client may sue in contract for loss 
suffered as a result of negligent advice given. If there is 
no express term in the contract stating that the services 
shall be carried out with due care and skill, there will be 
such a term implied by statute to that effect.9 The client 
may also sue in negligence, and this may be preferable 
to suing for breach of contract in certain situations. In 
contract law the limitation period commences when the 
contract is breached,10 and the resultant damage may 
not be immediately obvious. In tort, the limitation 
period starts when the damage is discovered.11 In 
addition the assessment of damages is more 
advantageous to the plaintiff in a tort action.  
 
Pure economic loss may also occur where there is no 
immediate relationship between the giver of the advice 
and the person who acts on it. An example of this is the 
1964 UK House of Lords case of Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (‘Hedley Byrne’).12 A bank 
(Heller & Partners) gave a report on the 
creditworthiness of one of its clients (Easipower Ltd) to 
the bank (the National Provincial Bank) of a third party 
(Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd) who requested this 
information before making a decision about granting 
credit to Easipower. Based on the report given by Heller 
& Partners to the National Provincial Bank, Hedley 
Byrne & Co Ltd granted credit to Easipower and lost 
money when Easipower went into liquidation.  
 
service?’ with ‘if they provide financial product advice’: s 
12BAB ASIC Act. 
9 For example by s 12ED of the ASIC Act. 
10 This is the period within which a plaintiff must commence 
an action. In Western Australia the limitation period for tort 
and contract is six years: Limitation Act 2005 (WA) s 13.  
11 In misrepresentation cases it may be difficult to pinpoint 
when exactly the limitation period starts. For a discussion on 
this see Margot Clarkson, Negligent Misstatement Causing 
Economic Loss – When Does the Statutory Limitation Period 
Begin to Run? (2008) Clarkson Giacomi Solicitors < 
http://www.clarksongiacomi.com.au/download/Limitation_of
_Actions.pdf > at 10 Aug 2009. 
12 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 
465. The facts are given here, and the case is discussed again 
in more detail later. 
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Historically the courts were reluctant to compensate for 
pure economic loss in these circumstances. As Fleming 
puts it:13
 
The courts were daunted by the prospect of a 
vast liability that was feared to descend on the 
frail shoulders of such as accountants, 
surveyors, bankers and lawyers whose daily 
job it is to offer guidance in financial 
transactions of frequently considerable 
dimensions. Such information is apt to be used 
by many persons other than the immediate 
client, but the cost of liability cannot be spread 
among them the way a manufacturer of goods 
can spread it over his products. In consequence 
the burden of potential liability could be 
wholly disproportionate to the professional’s 
fee. 
 
This is a policy argument for limiting recovery referred 
to as the ‘floodgates argument’.14 In the 1931 American 
case of Ultramares Corp v Touche (‘Ultramares’), 
Cardozo CJ expressed it as ‘a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class’.15 This case concerned 
misrepresentations made by accountants (Touche). In 
both Ultramares and Hedley Byrne the plaintiffs lost, 
but in the latter case the law had incrementally 
expanded and the loss was only because of a disclaimer 
attached to the information.  
 
The legal requirements in a negligent 
misrepresentation action 
Where the loss suffered by the plaintiff is the result of a 
negligent misrepresentation (negligent misstatement) 
the ordinary laws of negligence apply.16 There are some 
slight variations to the legal requirements because the 
loss is purely economic, and, as mentioned above, this 
                                                 
                                                
13 Fleming, above n 4, 189-191. 
14 F Trindade and P Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia 
(1999), 357. 
15 Ultramares Corp v Touche 174 NE 441 at 444 (NY1931). 
16 Note that negligence actions are now guided by the 
legislation enacted in the various Australian jurisdictions 
following the publication in 2002 of the Review of the Law of 
Negligence Report (commonly known as the Ipp Report). In 
Western Australia this is the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) 
(‘CLA’). 
is a developing area because of the historic concerns 
regarding indeterminate liability. 
 
In a negligence action the plaintiff must prove three 
things: the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care; 
the defendant fell below the required standard of care 
(scope of duty or standard of care); there has been 
material damage (here economic loss) caused to the 
plaintiff which is not too remote.17
 
The duty of care (the legal duty to be careful) 
Fleming defines the duty of care as ‘… an obligation, 
recognised by law, to avoid conduct fraught with 
unreasonable risk of danger to others.’18 In pure 
economic loss cases it is this particular requirement that 
poses difficulties for the plaintiff. This is where the 
arguments in relation to indeterminacy are played out. 
The history of the duty concept shows that the courts 
envisaged that there must be a nearness or closeness 
between the parties, a relationship that Lord Atkin 
defined in his ‘neighbour’ speech in Donoghue v 
Stevenson.19 Lord Atkin said:20  
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, 
then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer 
seems to be person who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind 
to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question. 
 
Where the ‘damage’ suffered by the plaintiff is personal 
injury, or damage to property, the courts generally have 
no difficulty in finding that a duty of care exists. In 
these cases the nature of the damage demonstrates that 
there must have been at least a physical closeness 
between the parties at some point. However, where the 
damage is pure economic loss, it may be harder to 
 
17 See, for example, McGlone and Stickley, above n 1, Ch 8. 
18 Fleming, above n 4, 149. 
19 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
20 Ibid 580.  
19 
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demonstrate that a sufficient relationship exists between 
the parties for a duty of care to be established.  
 
There are different categories of potential plaintiff who 
may make use of the negligent misrepresentation. Katter 
suggests these can be identified as the ‘intended user or 
class of user’, the ‘known but unintended user’, the 
‘unintended and unknown user’ and the ‘passive 
sufferer’.21 The difficulty in showing that a duty of care 
exists increases with each category. In the first category 
it is easier to establish the necessary nearness or 
closeness between the parties, not least because there 
may be a contract in existence between the two.  
 
The other two categories are more problematic for the 
plaintiff. In Hedley Byrne, Lord Pearce articulated the 
issue as follows:22
 
Negligence in words creates problems different 
from those of negligence in act. Words are 
more volatile than deeds. They travel fast and 
far afield. They are used without being 
expended and take effect in combination with 
innumerable facts and other words. Yet they 
are dangerous and can cause vast financial 
damage. 
 
Hedley Byrne, the facts of which have been discussed 
earlier, technically fell into the first category although 
there was no direct relationship between the plaintiff 
and defendant. Because there was no direct relationship, 
and no immediate contact between the parties, the 
courts until that case had held fast on finding no duty 
existed because of the floodgates principal. An example 
is the English Court of Appeal case Candler v Crane 
Christmas & Co where it was held by Cohen LJ and 
Asquith LJ, in the majority, that there was no duty owed 
by an accountant to a foreseeable third party for 
                                                 
                                                
21 N Katter, ‘The Ambit of Liability of Professionals for 
Negligent Advice or Information: The Laws in Great Britain 
and Australia’ (Working Paper No. 2003-002, School of 
Accountancy, Queensland University of Technology, 2003) 2, 
3, 5. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all except 
those categories most relevant to the topic. 
22 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 
465, 534 (Lord Pearce). 
negligent advice.23 This case would otherwise be 
unexceptional for the time if it were not for the 
dissenting judgment of Denning LJ who held that a duty 
in such circumstances should exist. Denning LJ found 
that the plaintiff was owed a duty of care because the 
defendant accountant was aware that the accounts 
would be given to a particular party, here the plaintiff, 
and that party would make use of them.24
 
In Hedley Byrne the House of Lords found that a duty 
did exist, but the plaintiff was unsuccessful because of 
an express disclaimer which stated at the beginning of 
the credit report ‘in confidence and without 
responsibility’.25 What is clear in Hedley Byrne is that 
although a duty of care may exist in these 
circumstances, it is limited, and only arises where the 
plaintiff can show there is a ‘special relationship’ 
between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
 
In Mutual Life & Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt 
(‘Mutual Life’),26 Barwick CJ said of the special 
relationship:27
 
First of all, I think the circumstances must be 
such as to have caused the speaker or be 
calculated to cause a reasonable person in the 
position of the speaker to realise that he is 
being trusted by the recipient of the 
information or advice to give information 
which the recipient believes the speaker to 
possess or to which the recipient believes the 
speaker to have access or to give advice, about 
a matter upon or in respect of which the 
recipient believes the speaker to possess a 
capacity or opportunity for judgment, in either 
case the subject matter of the information or 
advice being of a serious business nature. 
 
In Mutual Life the plaintiff sought information and 
advice from the defendant assurance company, with 
 
23 Candler v Crane Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164, 195 
(Asquith LJ).  
24 Ibid 182-184 (Denning LJ). 
25 An example of the judiciary opening the door a crack, but 
leaving it to their more adventurous successors to walk 
through.  
26 Mutual Life & Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 
122 CLR 556. 
27 Ibid 572 (Barwick CJ).  
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which the plaintiff was a policy holder, about the 
financial stability of one of the defendant’s subsidiaries. 
The advice given was that the subsidiary was financially 
secure, so the plaintiff increased his investment in the 
subsidiary (by way of further unsecured loans). When 
the subsidiary was liquidated, the plaintiff lost his 
investment. In the High Court of Australia the plaintiff 
was successful, but at the time appeals from the High 
Court to the Privy Council were still possible and the 
decision was overturned by the Privy Council.28 The 
Privy Council, by a majority, preferred a narrow 
approach holding that a duty of care would exist only 
where the giver of the advice was skilled in the 
particular field in which the advice was being sought.29
 
Although the plaintiff ultimately lost the case in the 
Privy Council, the High Court decision still has 
influence. This is evidenced by the decision in 
Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City 
Council (‘Shaddock’),30 where the High Court reverted 
to a wider approach as to those relationships where a 
duty of care would exist. In Shaddock, it was 
information rather than advice that was the issue, but 
the case again involved an intended user. The High 
Court found the Parramatta City Council liable to the 
plaintiff developer for failing to advise of road widening 
plans in existence at the time of the purchase by the 
plaintiff of a development property. The facts of the 
case were that the plaintiff's solicitor had submitted a 
form to the Council in application for a certificate under 
s 342AS of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW). 
The form asked whether there were any road widening 
proposals affecting the property, to which the Council 
                                                 
                                                
28 The Australia Act 1986 (Cth) abolished appeals to the Privy 
Council. 
29 Between Mutual Life and Shaddock the High Court decision 
in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge ‘Willemstad’ 
(1976) 136 CLR 529 further developed liability in Australia 
for pure economic loss. The defendant was found to owe the 
plaintiff a duty of care in a case of what is termed ‘relational 
loss’. This is where the pure economic loss claimed by the 
plaintiff arises out of damage to the property of a third party 
rather than to the property of the plaintiff.  
30 Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council 
(1980-1981) 150 CLR 225. 
made no response. As it was the usual practice of the 
Council to make a notation on the certificate if such 
proposals did apply, the solicitor assumed that the 
property was clear and the purchase went ahead. The 
developer sued the Council, losing at first instance and 
on appeal to New South Wales Court of Appeal 
Division, but won in the High Court. A total of 
$173,938 damages were awarded. This was made up of 
$133,000 for the difference in price between the actual 
value of the property and the price paid by the 
developer, an amount of $18,745 for consequential 
damage, including, for example, such items as Council 
rates, land tax, insurance, stamp duty, and an interest 
component of $22,193. 
 
In Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (‘Tepko’)31 the plaintiff 
was not successful. The plaintiff was engaging in a 
series of business arrangements for which it obtained a 
loan from a bank. As one part of these business 
arrangements the plaintiff proposed to develop a parcel 
of land into rural residential allotments; this required the 
rezoning of the land from rural to residential. As 
security for the loan, the bank had a first registered 
mortgage over the land. The proposed development was 
just outside the defendant’s supply system which 
serviced the nearest town (Wallacia in NSW), and it 
became clear that the rezoning approval by the two 
local councils was conditional upon an arrangement for 
the supply of water by the defendant to the subdivision. 
The defendant indicated this would be complex and 
expensive, and the continuance of the bank loan then 
became dependant on some precise costing rather than 
an estimate. The plaintiff came into possession of 
correspondence on the matter between the defendant 
and third parties giving an estimate of the cost of 
establishing the water supply to the proposed 
development. When the plaintiffs made the bank aware 
of this water supply costing, the bank decided the 
project was not viable, and appointed a receiver. It then 
 
31 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board [1999] NSWCA 40; Tepko 
Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1. 
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exercised its power of sale as a mortgagee by selling the 
land. It eventuated that the cost of supply was in fact 
considerably less than originally stated, and, as a result, 
the land had been sold at a discount. The plaintiff sued 
the defendant for negligence, i.e. the negligent 
misstatement in the estimate.32 A 4:3 majority of the 
High Court held that no duty of care was owed. The 
justices in the majority acknowledged that it was 
foreseeable by the defendant that the plaintiff would 
become aware of the estimated figure. They found, 
however, that there was no assumption of responsibility 
on the part of the defendant, nor was the reliance on the 
estimate by plaintiffs reasonable.33 In Katter’s 
classification, mentioned earlier, the High Court 
majority found the plaintiff to be a known but 
unintended user. In the words of Gleeson CJ, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ:34
 
[I]t cannot be concluded, in my view, that the 
Water Board either knew or should have 
known that the appellants intended to act upon 
that cost estimate for any purpose, let alone a 
serious purpose. And because the Water Board 
indicated that it was prepared to enter into 
further discussions with the appellants, it 
cannot be concluded that it assumed any 
responsibility in relation to that estimate. 
 
What becomes clear from the cases discussed above is 
that in order for a duty of care to exist where there is no 
immediate relationship between the parties (such as 
exists between a financial advisor and client), there are 
a number of factors that are relevant.35 In particular, the 
court will consider such matters as reasonable reliance 
by the recipient; the knowledge of this reliance and an 
                                                 
                                                
32 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1, 1-2. 
33 Ibid 25-27. Interestingly the joint majority judgment of 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow & Hayne JJ says: ‘… it is not to the 
point that if the pleadings had tendered another issue and the 
evidence had been somewhat different, some duty with a 
changed content might have been established’: Tepko Pty Ltd 
v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1, 5-6.  
34 Ibid 26 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow & Hayne JJ). 
35 For further judicial examination of the relevant factors, see 
Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd 
(1999) 198 CLR 180; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v 
CDG Property Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515. These are pure 
economic loss cases, but the loss did not result from a 
negligent misrepresentation.  
associated assumption of responsibility by the giver of 
the advice or information (or by a reasonable 
defendant), and any negation of that assumption of 
responsibility by way of a disclaimer.36  
 
So far the cases covered have concerned fact situations 
where the plaintiff was known to the defendant, even if 
there was no immediate relationship. Where the plaintiff 
is an unintended and unknown user the prospects of 
success are most unlikely. This is clear from two cases, 
one decided by the House of Lords in the U.K. and the 
other by the Australian High Court. The former is 
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman (‘Caparo’),37 where 
the plaintiff, Caparo Industries, bought shares in a third 
party company relying on inaccurate accounts prepared 
by the defendant. The plaintiff already had shares in the 
company as part of a takeover bid. The plaintiff lost, on 
the basis that ‘statutory audits … are addressed to 
shareholders as an entity, not as individuals’.38 The 
Australian case is Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v 
Peat Marwick Hungerfords (‘Esanda’).39 The plaintiff 
Esanda entered into some financial transactions with a 
third party company, Excel, which later went into 
receivership resulting in loss to Esanda. Esanda sued 
Peat Marwick Hungerfords (PMH) alleging that, when 
entering into the financial transactions with Excel, 
Esanda had relied on accounts which had been 
negligently certified by PMH.40 Because there was 
insufficiency of relationship between Esanda and PMH, 
Esanda lost; in other words Esanda could not show that 
it had any ‘special relationship’ with PMH in respect of 
the financial transactions undertaken with Excel. 
Brennan CJ stated the requirements for Esanda as 
follows:41
 
36 See, for example the headings in the joint majority 
judgment in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1, 
25-26 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow & Hayne JJ). 
37 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. See also 
Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Customs and Excise v 
Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28. 
38 Fleming, above n 4, 711. 
39 Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick 
Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241.  
40 Ibid 241. 
41 Ibid 249 (Brennan CJ). The italics are in the text. 
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The statement of claim pleaded that AAS5 
prescribed the standard of skill, care and 
competence which an auditor who purports to 
be performing a professional duty is required 
to observe. But a plaintiff who complains of an 
auditor’s failure to observe an auditing 
standard must plead and prove that the auditor 
owed to the plaintiff a duty to observe that 
standard in performance of the duties of 
auditor. 
 
Dawson J alluded to the problem of indeterminacy:42
 
However, mere foreseeability of harm does 
not, where the only harm is pure economic 
loss, give rise to a duty of care. The reason for 
this is that a duty of care imposed by reference 
to the mere foreseeability of harm in the form 
of financial loss would extend liability in 
negligence beyond acceptable bounds. 
Financial loss occurs as the result of legitimate 
commercial competition, and commercial 
activity would be stifled if the law were to 
impose a duty to take care to avoid that loss. 
Moreover, if the circumstances in which there 
was a duty of care to avoid causing purely 
financial loss were not confined, the extent of 
the liability imposed would in many cases be 
virtually without limits, both in terms of 
persons and amount.  
 
While the defendant in Esanda was an auditor, these 
principles apply equally to any case where the 
defendant is giving advice. 
 
Standard of care (how careful is careful enough?) 
This is the negligence part of a negligence action, and is 
also referred to as the scope of duty. The required 
standard of care expected of a defendant is reasonable 
care. Reasonable care is determined by objective 
standards: ‘… in other words, the appropriate standard 
is not that which the defendant could have reached, but 
rather the standard which the law says should have been 
reached.’43
 
                                                 
                                                
42 Ibid 254(Dawson J). 
43 Trindade and Cane, above n 14, 436. See Alderson B in 
Blythe v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Ex 781; 
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
Where there are professional standards regulating a 
particular profession, whether the regulations are 
imposed by the profession itself or by statute, the courts 
regard these as a minimum standard. Amendments to 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) by virtue of the Financial Services Reform Act 
2001 (Cth) brought the operators of a ‘financial services 
business’, meaning ‘a business of providing financial 
services’, under the purview of the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC).44 Under Part 7.6 
of Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
providers of financial services must be licensed. 
Division 3 of Part 7.6 imposes certain obligations on 
licensees, which include compliance with standards and 
requirements made or approved by ASIC.  
 
In a negligence case, failure to conform to professional 
standards may mean the defendant has not reached the 
required standard of care. Conformance, however, does 
not necessarily mean the defendant has been careful 
enough. The same principles apply to compliance with 
custom and accepted commercial standards. The High 
Court has determined quite a long time ago that 
compliance with accepted standards would not 
necessarily exonerate the defendant from liability.45
 
Damage 
The third element the plaintiff has to prove is that the 
plaintiff has suffered damage, i.e. the plaintiff has 
suffered material injury caused by the negligent act of 
the defendant (causation) and such damage is not too 
remote (remoteness). The damage, or material injury, 
claimed in negligent misrepresentation cases is the 






44 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 761A. 
45 Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport (1937) 56 CLR 
580, 589. For a more recent decision, see also Rogers v 
Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, 
Toohey and McHugh JJ) 483, 487-488. 
23 
Legal Issues in Business 
Causation 
Causation at common law requires the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant’s negligence caused, or materially 
contributed to, the plaintiff’s loss. The defendant’s 
negligence does not have to be the only cause of the 
loss providing it is a cause of the loss. This may be 
established by using the ‘but for’ test: the question 
asked is, ‘Would the plaintiff's loss have occurred “but 
for” the defendant’s negligence?’46 If the loss would 
have occurred even if the defendant had not been 
negligent, the defendant is not liable. The ‘but for’ test 
has practical limitations, for example ‘the absurd and 
unjust position that there was no “cause” of an injury in 
any case where there were present two independent and 
sufficient causes of the accident in which the injury was 
sustained’.47 Another limitation is where there is a 
superseding event between the defendant’s negligent act 
and the plaintiff’s injury. These difficulties have been 
resolved judicially by a combination of the ‘but for’ test 
and the ‘common sense’ test.48  
 
There is now a statutory test for causation by virtue of 
the Civil Liability Act in each State. In the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA) (the ‘CLA’) this is referred to 
as ‘factual causation’, and where this cannot be 
established ‘in accordance with established principles’ 
(presumably by reference to the common law 
jurisprudence), the court is left to decide whether the 
loss should shift to the defendant or remain with the 
plaintiff.49
 
Where negligent misrepresentation on the part of an 
advisor in the financial services industry is concerned, 
causation may be a factor if it can be shown that the 
relevant advice or information was not the reason for 
the financial decision made by the plaintiff. An example 
would be where there is evidence that the plaintiff 
                                                 
46 EH March v Stramare (1990-1991) 171 CLR 506, 533-534 
(McHugh J). 
47 Ibid 523 (Deane J). 
48 Ibid 519 (Mason CJ), 524 (Deane J). 
49 Section 5C (1)(a) and 5C(2) of the CLA. 
would have made the same decision even had they 
known the representation was false.50
 
Remoteness 
Where the defendant’s negligence has caused the 
plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff is only compensated 
where the damage caused by the defendant was 
reasonably foreseeable. Consequences are reasonably 
foreseeable if they are the result of the occurrence of ‘a 
real risk … which would occur to the mind of a 
reasonable man … and which he would not brush aside 
as far-fetched’.51 This appears in the CLA as ‘scope of 
liability’ and again allows a normative assessment by 
the judiciary of whether the loss should be shifted.52
 
Conclusion 
An advisor in the finance industry may be liable in the 
tort of negligence for information or advice given in the 
course of his or her employment. This liability depends 
on whether a duty of care is owed by the defendant to 
the plaintiff who claims to have suffered financial loss 
because of the advice. The discussion of duty of care 
shows that where there is a contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant it is not difficult for the plaintiff 
to show a duty of care exists. Where the defendant has 
given the advice to a third party and the plaintiff (who is 
unknown to the defendant), has acted on the advice to 
their financial detriment the policy arguments, based on 
indeterminacy, work in favour of the defendant. In 
between the two exists a grey area where the courts will 
investigate certain factors before deciding whether a 
duty of care exists. These factors may include 
reasonable reliance by the recipient; the knowledge of 
this reliance and an associated assumption of 
responsibility by the giver of the advice or information 
                                                 
50 JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom [1983] 1 All ER 583. 
51 Overseas Tankships (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co 
Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617, 643 
(Lord Reid). 
52 Section 5C (1)(b) and 5C(4) of the CLA. The Ipp Report 
specifically includes ‘foreseeability’ and ‘remoteness of 
damage’ in the list of terms subsumed into this provision: 
Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report (2002) 
Canberra, para. 7.49. 
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(or by a reasonable defendant), and any negation of that 
assumption of responsibility by way of a disclaimer. 
Liability in negligence also depends on whether the 
defendant has fallen below the required standard of 
care, measured against professional standards and 
regulations as a minimum, and also whether it was 
actually the negligent advice of the defendant that 
caused the financial loss to the plaintiff. 
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